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REINVIGORATING AUTONOMY:
FREEDOM-AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SUPREME
COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Christina E. Wells*
Introduction
Several influential scholars agree that individual autonomy-the con-
cept of people as rational, self-deliberating actors-has been a driving
force behind the Supreme Court's protection of speech and expression.'
A lively debate has arisen, however, as to whether autonomy should
underlie free speech jurisprudence. Some commentators favor the Court's
approach, arguing that freedom from government censorship is critical to
our development as individuals and our capacity for self-governance.2 In
contrast, other scholars contend that First Amendment jurisprudence should
focus less on protecting individual autonomy. They argue that the Court
should occasionally uphold government regulation of speech, especially
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I See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
141 (1993) ("[P]rinciples of autonomy have an enduring and important role to play in
the theory and practice of free expression."); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405, 1409-10 (1986) ("[T]he freedom of speech guaran-
teed by the first amendment amounts to a protection of autonomy-it is the shield around
the speaker.') (paraphrasing Harry Kalven) [hereinafter Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure]; Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty,
59 U. CH. L. REV. 225, 233-34 (1992) (noting that "[fireedom of expression is properly
based on autonomy"); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amend-
ment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267, 279-80 (1991) (noting that the First Amendment is
designed to protect democracy which is based on autonomous norms); David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 353-55
(1991) (arguing that the "persuasion principle" found throughout the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence is based on autonomy). But see Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust,
64 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court's free speech
jurisprudence "is much richer and more complex than the autonomy model would
suggest").
2 See, e.g., Fried, supra note 1, at 233 (noting that autonomy means that "the state
has no claim to dominion over our minds: what we believe, what we are persuaded to
believe, and (derivatively) what others may try to persuade us to believe"); Post, supra
note 1, at 282 (arguing that "self-determination requires the maintenance of a structure of
communication open to all").
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regulation designed to remedy distortions in the current "marketplace of
ideas" 3 or to otherwise "insure the richness of public debate."4
The autonomy debate has raged in First Amendment scholarship in
recent years, both generally and in specific contexts such as hate speech,5
broadcast regulation, 6 and campaign finance reform,7 and the debate is far
from resolution. The intractability of the two sides is largely due to the
impoverished notion of autonomy that dominates the debate. By ground-
ing the Court's autonomy rationale in its antipathy toward content dis-
crimination of speech,8 the debate posits autonomy as personified by
isolated and self-interested individuals acting with little or no regard for
3 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 28-43 (arguing generally for regulation of speech in
a manner similar to New Deal legislation); Owen M. Fiss, Why tile State?, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 781, 788 (1987) ("The state [should] ... counteract the skew of public debate
attributable to the market and thus preserve the essential conditions of democracy.")
[hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?].
Justice Holmes first alluded to the "marketplace of ideas" in his dissent in Abrams v.
United States, noting "that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.' Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). The Court has since used Holmes's rhetoric in several free speech cases.
See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257-59 (1986); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980); Red Lion Broad.,
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969.).4 Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 3, at 791; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech
Now, 59 U. CHl. L. REV. 255, 267 (1992) ("[Iln some circumstances, what seems to be
government regulation of speech actually might promote free speech... ,').
5 See Charles R. Lawrence III, If.He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 434 ("At the center of the [hate speech] controversy is
a tension between the constitutional values of free speech and equality."). Compare Fried,
supra note 1, at 233-50 (arguing generally that the Court's focus on autonomy prevents
regulation of hate speech) with SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 193 ("When speech helps to
contribute to the creation of a caste system, the State can legitimately and neutrally attempt
to respond... "').6 See, e.g., Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 3 (making anti-autonomy arguments in
the context of broadcast regulation); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and
the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373 (1993) (discussing autonomy rationale in context of
broadcasting); R. Randall Rainey, The Public's Interest in Public Affairs Discourse,
Democratic Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public
Interest Duties of the Electronic Media, 82 GEo. L.J. 269 (1993) (making anti-autonomy
arguments in the context of broadcast regulation).
7See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 93-101 (arguing for regulation of campaign
contributions and expenditures in order to promote political deliberation and equality);
Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1045, 1069-74 (1985) (questioning arguments
that the State should be able to regulate campaign finances in the name of political
equality). For a review of the relevant arguments regarding the First Amendment and
campaign financing, see Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Argu-
ments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1260-69 (1994).
8 The Court's prohibition against content discrimination essentially forbids the gov-
ernment from suppressing speech based upon "the message it conveys." Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHL L. REv. 46, 47 (1987); see, e.g., Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49
(1969). For a more thorough discussion of this principle, see infra Part III.A.
[Vol. 32
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their community or the welfare of other individuals. The debate thus pits
a rather unsympathetic version of autonomy against the needs of the
community and the welfare of its citizens in a manner that is largely
irresolvable.
A closer examination of the structure of the Court's free speech
jurisprudence, however, reveals that it reflects a far richer and more
complex concept of autonomy-one based on the rights and responsibili-
ties of personhood that is generally associated with Immanuel Kant. Auton-
omy in this sense is not about atomistic individuals but about social
creatures entitled to respect for their dignity. In turn, members of society
are responsible for respecting the dignity of others. As such, Kantian
autonomy attempts to reconcile, rather than divorce, individuality and
community. With this understanding of autonomy, we can reexamine the
scholarly debate, in particular the still hotly contested issue of hate speech
regulation. An analysis of free speech cases in light of Kantian autonomy
refutes the assumption that the Court has elevated the speech rights of
individuals over the needs of the community. On the contrary, the Court's
jurisprudence attempts to reconcile individuality and community.
Part I of this Article explores the conception of autonomy that schol-
ars have generally attributed to the Court and discusses problems with
that conception. Part II sets forth an alternative, Kantian conception of
autonomy and discusses its implications for a system of laws regulating
free expression. Part III analyzes the Court's free speech jurisprudence
and its autonomy rationale. It specifically examines both the Court's
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech9
and its approach to low-value speech,10 demonstrating that they reflect a
Kantian notion of autonomy. Finally, Part IV discusses the implications
of Kantian autonomy for hate speech regulation, specifically focusing on
the Court's controversial decision in R.A.V v. City of St. Paul.11 This final
Part demonstrates that a Kantian notion of autonomy may be able to bring
people on both sides of the debate closer together regarding autonomy's
place in the Court's free speech jurisprudence.
9 Content-based restrictions limit speech based upon its message. Content-neutral
restrictions may impact speech but are not aimed at its content. The Court judges these
regulations under different standards, applying strict scrutiny to content-based regulations
while reviewing content-neutral regulations under a more lenient standard. For a more
thorough discussion, see infra Part III.A.
10The Court has created several categories of speech that it considers to be of lesser
value than other speech protected by the First Amendment. Such categories include: speech
inciting unlawful action; fighting words; obscenity; libel; and commercial speech. Unlike
high-value speech, the Court does not review regulations of low-value speech to determine
whether they are content-based or content-neutral. Instead, the Court has developed tests
unique to each category of low-value speech to determine whether regulations are
constitutional.
11505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down St. Paul ordinance banning racially hateful
fighting words). For a more thorough discussion of R.A.V, see infra Part IV.B.
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I. The Conception of Autonomy Emerging from the Scholarly Debate
A central issue in the autonomy debate has been whether the govern-
ment's regulation of speech can improve the quality of public discourse.
Scholars on both sides of the issue agree that the Court is antipathetic
toward such regulation, and emphasizes that its current jurisprudence is
particularly hostile toward government suppression of speech based upon
its content. 12 Thus, the debate's focus is whether the Court's approach is
defensible.
Scholars who generally favor1 3 the Court's approach point out that
our "status as rational sovereign[s] requires that [we] be free to judge for
[ourselves] what is good and how [we] shall arrange [our] li[ves] .... 14
Thus, the Court's hostility toward government suppression of speech is
essential to preserve public discourse and, ultimately, our capacity for
self-governance. 15 In contrast, scholars criticizing the Court's unrelenting
antipathy toward government regulation of speech agree that it stems from
a desire to protect autonomy,' 6 but view the consequences negatively.
According to these commentators, the Court's desire to erect a "shield
around the speaker"'17 actually distorts public debate and undermines de-
mocracy, primarily by ignoring the fact that the State is not the only threat
to speech.' 8 They argue that in today's era of huge media corporations
2See, e.g., Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 1, at 1408-09 (noting
that the Court's "rule against content regulation ... stands as the cornerstone of the Free
Speech Tradition"); Fried, supra note 1, at 233-34 (asserting that Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence is hostile toward "impositions by government"); Robert Post, Meiklejohn's
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. Rv.
1109, 1109 (1993) ("The Supreme Court has been largely hostile to this agenda, objecting
to its tendency to achieve its purposes through the suppression of individual speech.");
Strauss, supra note 1, at 334-35 (noting that the "persuasion principle," which "holds that
the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to
persuade people" has heavily influenced the Court's free speech jurisprudence); see also
cases cited supra note 8.
13I use the term "generally favor" to indicate that these scholars tend to agree with
the Court's antipathy toward suppression of speech based upon its content. That is not to
say that they necessarily agree with every aspect of the Court's jurisprudence.
14 Fried, supra note 1, at 233.
IsSee, e.g., id. at 233 (noting that autonomy does not "requir[e], indeed self-respect
forbids, that I cede to the state the authority to limit my use of my rational powers"); Post,
supra note 12, at 1116 ("Censorship cuts off its victims from participation in the enterprise
of autonomous self-government ...:'); Strauss, supra note 1, at 356 (noting that
"violations of the persuasion principle infringe human autonomy: they manipulate people
by, in part, taking over their thinking processes....").
16 See, e.g., Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 1, at 1409-10.
171d. at 1409.
'$See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at xix, 93 ("[A]utonomy, guaranteed as it is by
law, may itself be an abridgement of the free speech right .. . .My special concern is
that the First Amendment is sometimes used to undermine democracy."); Fiss, Free Speech
and Social Structure, supra note 1, at 1409-13 (discussing generally tension between
autonomy and rich public debate paradigms).
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and social inequality, it is far too easy for politically or economically
powerful speakers to comer the speech market, thereby distorting debate
as much or more than any government regulation. 19 Instead of focusing
on autonomy, which exalts the speaker's rights20 and is consistently hos-
tile to government regulations, these scholars conclude that we should
view "the state not only as an enemy but also as a friend of speech ....
When the state acts to enhance the quality of public debate, we should
recognize its actions as consistent with the first amendment.
l2 1
One of the most striking aspects of the debate is the conception of
autonomy that underlies it. Both sides assume that the Court's hostility
toward content discrimination is the best example of its concern for
protection of autonomy. Autonomy in this sense translates into individual
freedom from government interference. Moreover, once conceived of as
a negative liberty, autonomy becomes closely associated with speakers;
as the debate is framed, autonomy in the Court's free speech jurisprudence
means freedom of the speaker to say whatever she wants.2 2 It is this
19 See, e.g., Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 3, at 787-90 (noting that current public
debate is dominated by large television networks and newspaper corporations who can
ignore or silence particular viewpoints); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 270-72 (discussing
various distortions of debate created by private actors). Professors Fiss and Sunstein use
the broadcasting context to illustrate their belief that private actors are as much a threat
to speech as are government actors. One can extend the argument, however, to any instance
in which there is inequality of resources or social or political power. See Fiss, Free Speech
and Social Structure, supra note 1, at 1410-12 (discussing problems that scarcity and
social inequality pose for current free speech jurisprudence); see also Lawrence, supra
note 5, at 466-72 (noting the problems that racism and unequal social power pose in the
free speech context).2 0 See Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 1, at 1408-13 (arguing that
the Court's jurisprudence exalts the liberty of the speaker over the collective self-determi-
nation of the community); see also Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity,
and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REv. 103, 115 (1992)
(noting the "primacy of individualism" in much of the Court's free speech jurisprudence).2 t Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 1, at 1416; see also SUNSTEIN,
supra note 1, at xix (arguing that "government controls on the broadcast media, designed
to ensure diversity of view and attention to public affairs, would help the system of free
expression. Such controls could promote both political deliberation and political equal-
ity.").2 2 Detractors of autonomy believe that it focuses too much on the speaker's rights.
See, e.g., Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 1, at 1408-13. It is not as
clear whether supporters of the Court believe that autonomy only involves the rights of
speakers. Much of their rhetoric suggests that they view autonomy as the right to be free
from government interference with our thought processes. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 1,
at 233. Such a view of autonomy focuses not only on the speaker but also on the audience's
right to hear information. Moreover, it is also unclear whether these scholars believe that
the Court's conception of autonomy is listener-oriented. Professor Strauss, for example,
puts forth his own audience-oriented version of autonomy. See generally Strauss, supra
note 1. Yet he maintains that the Court's jurisprudence is currently "well suited to consider
free speech issues when the claim to freedom of expression is based on the rights of the
speaker." David A. Strauss, Rights and the System of Freedom of Expression, 1993 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 197, 198.
Ultimately, by concentrating on only one aspect of the Court's jurisprudence-free-
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characterization of autonomy that makes the debate so intractable. Label-
ing autonomy solely as the right of the speaker conjures up images of
atomistic individuals saying whatever they wish with little regard for the
needs of others.23 Scholars thus associate autonomy with the lone speaker
defending her right to shout racial epithets or the large corporation de-
fending its right to donate huge sums of money to political candidates.
Both invoke the label "freedom of speech" while ignoring the substantial
emotional harm and distortion of public debate such speech can cause.
Under the terms of the debate, one is forced to choose between being
either pro-autonomy or pro-community. Society, and more importantly the
Supreme Court, apparently cannot value both ideals.
But does the debate accurately portray the concept of autonomy
reflected in the Court's free speech jurisprudence? Scholars are at least
partially correct in locating an autonomy rationale in the Court's hostility
toward government censorship. Their mistake, however, is focusing only
on that aspect of the Court's jurisprudence. 24 In order to fully understand
the Supreme Court's conception of autonomy, one must examine the
overall structure of the Court's jurisprudence, which encompasses not
only the Court's principle against content discrimination but also its treat-
ment of low-value speech. That examination reveals a richer and more
complex notion of autonomy, one that focuses not only on freedom from
government interference but also on private citizens' relationships with
dom from government interference with speech-pro-autonomy scholars have at least
allowed the debate to be labeled as one pitting the rights of speakers against the rights of
others and the community. See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 6, at 381 ("[I]n the First
Amendment context, the value of autonomy tends to be equated (by its proponents and
opponents alike) automatically and exclusively with the autonomy of speakers.").
23 Criticism of the notion of autonomy as embodying selfish individualism is not
limited to the free speech context. Rather, it has been the basis of a broader jurisprudential
debate over the nature of liberal theory. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 47-48 (1991) (criticizing the liberal
image of the "rights-bearer as a self-determining, unencumbered individual, a being
connected to others only by choice"); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF JUSTICE 182 (1982) (criticizing the liberal notion of people as "unencumbered selves").24Scholars' emphases on the Court's prohibition against content discrimination is
largely understandable. Over the last few decades the Court has paid increasing attention
to its prohibition against content discrimination. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, The First
Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 204 (1982) ("Since its
announcement [in 1972], the constitutional principle limiting the power of government to
distinguish speech according to its content has played a significant role in the Supreme
Court's decisions.'); Stone, supra note 8, at 46 ("The content-based/content-neutral
distinction plays a central role in contemporary first amendment jurisprudence."). Indeed,
some of the Court's recent cases appear to make that principle the most important aspect
of its jurisprudence. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding
that the government cannot engage in selective content discrimination against speech even
if that speech was otherwise unprotected by the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.').
[Vol. 32
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each other. This conception of autonomy is far removed from atomistic
individualism. Instead, it recognizes that we are social beings with rights
and responsibilities. This critical insight may provide a middle ground to
the debate's otherwise rigid division between autonomy and community.
II. Autonomy in Kant's Moral and Political Theory
The conception of autonomy underlying the Court's free speech ju-
risprudence derives primarily from Immanuel Kant's moral and political
philosophy. I rely on Kant not only because he was "arguably the most
important moral philosopher of the modem period" 25 but also because-his
"extraordinarily powerful [theory] ... still seems to many thoughtful
people to be an essentially correct view. '26 This Part discusses the major
themes of Kant's philosophy and its general implications for a system of
free expression.27 Part IlI then discusses the Court's actual free speech
jurisprudence and its relation to Kantian philosophy.
A. Kantian Theory
In the Kantian ethic, "every rational being exists as an end in him-
self.'' 28 Thus, Kant equates autonomy and personhood. Scholars interpret
autonomy, in this sense, as less a right than a capacity of persons to "make
and act on their own decisions?' 29 Significantly, our innate autonomy (or
freedom or dignity)30 does not leave us entirely free to act to satisfy our
desires. Rather, each individual's autonomy implies an obligation to re-
spect the freedom of others and imposes responsibility when we fail to
25 ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY xiii (1989).
26 Id.
27 A complete analysis of Kantian philosophy is beyond the scope of this Article. My
modest aim here is to highlight Kant's key ideas, especially as they relate to autonomy.
28 IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46 (Lewis W.
Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1959) [hereinafter KANT, FOUNDATIONS].29 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 878 (1994)
[hereinafter Fallon, Autonomy]; see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT 80 (1970) (noting that in Kantian theory "[tihe worth of a rational being, and thus
the worth of man, consists ...in his autonomy from the course of mere phenomenal
nature. For his dignity consists in his being a self-legislative member in a realm of ends:');
SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 235 (defining Kantian autonomy as "the ability and obligation
of a person to act on rational principles of his or her own adoption").30As one scholar has noted, "[iln Kant's moral theory it is usually possible to use
the word 'autonomy' in place of 'freedom.' An autonomous person is one who judges
and acts freely ...by principles of reason alone." SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 46.
Similarly, Kant's philosophy tends to treat the concepts of autonomy and freedom as
interchangeable with the concept of humans' inalienable dignity. See id. at 193-95
(discussing concepts of autonomy and dignity with respect to Kant's universal moral law).
I also will use freedom, dignity, and autonomy interchangeably when discussing Kantian
notions of autonomy.
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do so.3' Kantian autonomy is considered to be a foundation for moral
precepts-in other words, what we ought to do given the innate dignity
of all persons. Nevertheless, autonomy is not a concept limited to the
moral realm. Instead, Kant's notion of autonomy has a significant place
in his political theory, defining not only the role of the State but also the
legal rights and obligations of citizens toward each other.32
According to Kant, the ultimate justification of the State is to protect
the autonomy of its citizens. 33 As an initial matter, our innate autonomy
31 See KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 28, at 49 (noting that our inherent freedom
operates as "the supreme limiting condition on the freedom of the actions of each man");
see also Fallon, Autonomy, supra note 29, at 891 (noting that ascriptive Kantian autonomy
"implies responsibility for harms voluntarily committed against others"); SULLIVAN, supra
note 25, at 47 ("For Kant, the term 'autonomy' denotes our ability and responsibility to
know what morality requires of us and our determination not to act immorally.").
According to Kant, all of our moral judgments must be universalizable: we must act
in a way consistent with a moral law that we would apply to ourselves and not just others.
Given that people are ends in themselves, morality requires that we act respectfully of the
personhood or autonomy of all others. As Kant notes:
Now, I say, man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in himself
and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will .... Thus
if there is to be" a supreme principle and a categorical imperative for the human
will, it must be one that forms an objective principle of the will from the
conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end
in itself. Hence this objective principle can serve as a universal practical law. The
ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself.
KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 28, at 46-47. For a more thorough discussion of Kant's
notion of universalization, see MURPHY, supra note 29, at 65-86.32Some scholars disagree with the claim that autonomy underlies Kant's political
theory. Professor Fletcher, for example, agrees that Kant's moral theory derives from
notions of autonomy, see George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 533, 541 (1987) (noting that Kant's moral theory is grounded in a
concept of "absolute human worth"), but asserts that his political theory is not "an
application and extension of [Kant's] moral concepts," id. at 553. Despite Professor
Fletcher's interesting argument, I am persuaded by the weight of scholarship that treats
both Kant's moral and political philosophy as stemming from the idea of autonomy. See,
e.g., MURPHY, supra note 29, at 56 (stating that Kant's "'supreme principle of morality'
... bears on the theory of right" which is the basis of his political philosophy); SULLIVAN,
supra note 25, at 258-59 (arguing that Kant's "moral law appears ...as the political
Principle of Right"); Peter Benson, External Freedom According to Kant, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 559 (1987) (arguing generally that the notion of autonomy in Kant's moral theory
also appears in his political theory); Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as Idea of Reason, in ESSAYS
ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15, 41 (Howard L. Williams ed., 1992) (noting that
the "concept of right [in Kantian political theory] presupposes the equal status of free
wills").33 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE COMMON SAYING: 'THIS MAY BE TRUE IN
THEORY, BUT IT DOES NOT APPLY IN PRACTICE', reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS
61, 74 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1991)
[hereinafter KANT, THEORY & PRACTICEI (discussing the "freedom of every member of
society as a human being" as a foundation of the civil state); see also SULLIVAN, supra
note 25, at 240 ("Kant's most significant contribution to the development of classical
liberal theory . . . is his claim that the justification of the state ultimately must rest on
moral grounds, on the innate freedom of each person... !').
[Vol. 32
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surely limits the powers of the State against us; a government recognizing
the autonomy of its citizens necessarily derives its authority from the
rational consent of the governed. 34 Thus, the State has no power to coerce
us to act consistently with its independent conception of what is right or
good. Rather, its laws must respect our ability to deliberate and our
capacity to choose.35 Viewed in isolation, this aspect of Kantian theory
seems to support the concept of autonomy emerging in the scholarly
debate, which embodies only the right of individuals against the govern-
ment. But Kant's political philosophy is not so one-sided.
Recognizing that the actions of autonomous individuals operating in
a society can clash, Kant believed that the State could bring its coercive
power36 to bear against its citizens and thereby limit their freedom, in one,
and only one, circumstance-when some citizens' actions infringe upon
the freedom of others, and coercion is necessary to preserve the others'
autonomy.37 Such coercive action by the State preserves the dignity of its
citizens by ensuring that individuals act in a manner that respects the
34 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797), reprinted in
KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 33, at 131, 139, 163 [hereinafter KANT, META-
PHYSICS OF MORALS] ("[T]he Supreme power originally rests with the people .... [Each
citizen has the] lawful freedom to obey no law other than that to which he has given his
consent:'). Not surprisingly, Kant believed that the only moral government-the only
government recognizing the autonomy of its citizens-was a republic. Id. at 163.
35 Kant criticized a paternalistic government, even one that acts out of benevolence:
A government might be established on the principle of benevolence towards the
people, like that of a father towards his children. Under such a paternal govern-
inent ... the subjects, as immature children who cannot distinguish what is truly
useful or harmful to themselves, would be obliged to behave purely passively and
to rely upon the judgement of the head of the state as to how they ought to be
happy, and upon his kindness in willing their happiness at all. Such a government
is the greatest conceivable despotism, i.e. a constitution which suspends the entire
freedom of its subjects, who thenceforth have no rights whatsoever.
KANT, THEORY & PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 74; see also KANT, METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS, supra note 34, at 161-62 (noting that autocratic government is most dangerous
to free will and autonomy).
36As used here, the term "coercive power" refers to both the State's power to define
and punish illegal actions and its power to enforce civil obligations, such as contracts.
Kant discusses both types of coercion throughout his political theory. See, e.g., KANT,
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 34, at 154-59 (discussing the right of criminal
punishment); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 48 (W. Hastie trans., T. & T.
Clark, Law Publishers 1887) (discussing enforcement of debt collection as based in the
Principle of Right).37See KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 34, at 134. Kant notes:
[l]f a certain use to which freedom is put is itself a hindrance to freedom in
accordance with universal laws (i.e., if it is contrary to right), any coercion which
is used against it will be a hindrance to a hindrance of freedom, and will thus be
consonant with freedom in accordance with universal laws-that is, it will be
right. It thus follows by the law of contradiction that right entails the authority
to apply coercion to anyone who infringes it.
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freedom of others.38 Thus, the capacity for autonomy creates a moral
entitlement that imposes an obligation, enforceable by the State, to respect
the autonomy of other persons.
There is, however, a significant limitation on the State's ability to
enforce this obligation. The State may protect our freedom from infringe-
ment by others, but only with respect to external actions and not with
respect to the motives for such actions. 39 As Professor Roger Sullivan
explains, the State may "constrain the citizens from violating the respect
due others, but it cannot insist that they do so because they respect
them." 40 This limitation is important because it implies a distinction be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable State uses of coercion. State coercion
designed to preserve each citizen's autonomy from unwarranted interfer-
ence comports with a general respect for the autonomy of all citizens. But
coercion designed to bring internal motives in line with respect for such
freedom imposes the State's view of what is right or good on its citizens. 41
Id. Importantly, only the State is entitled to use coercion to preserve freedom. Individuals
are not so entitled. See, e.g., KANT, THEORY & PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 75 ("[No-one
can coerce anyone else other than through the public law and its executor, the head of the
state ....").3S According to Kant, "[e]very action which by itself or by its maxim enables the
freedom of each individual's will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in
accordance with a universal law is right." KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note
34, at 133; see also KANT, THEORY & PRACTICE, supra note 33 at 75-76 ("All right
consists solely in the restriction of the freedom of others, with the qualification that their
freedom can co-exist with my freedom within the terms of a general law . . . ."). The
"Principle of Right" is thus a slightly altered version of Kant's universal moral law. See
supra note 31. It is the Principle of Right that permits the only acceptable State coercion
against its citizens. See SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 242 ("Such coercion, used to protect
everyone's outer exercise of freedom equally by outlawing coercion by individuals, is the
only permissible limitation on the freedom of the individual:').
39 Kant made clear that "[tihe concept of right.. . applies only to those relationships
between one person and another which are both external and practical:' KANT, METAPHYS-
ICS OF MORALS, supra note 34, at 132-33. Thus,
although [the] law imposes an obligation on me, it does not mean that I am in
any way expected, far less required, to restrict my freedom myself to these
conditions purely for the sake of this obligation. On the contrary, reason merely
says that individual freedom is restricted in this way by virtue of the idea behind
it ....
If it is not our intention to teach virtue, but only to state what is right, we may
not and should not ourselves represent this law of right as a possible motive for
actions.
Id. at 133-34. In this sense, Kant's Principle of Right is a slightly restricted version of
his moral law which does concern itself with the motives for our actions.4 0 ROGER J. SULLIVAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S ETHICS 24 (1994).
41 Not only is any attempt to coerce our internal motives illegitimate, it is, as a
practical matter, impossible. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE END OF ALL THINGS, reprinted
in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 93, 102
(Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) ("[Ilt is contradictory to comnmand
someone not only to do something but to do it willingly.").
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Thus, our obligations to each other, while legally enforceable, are still
tempered with the ability to believe what we wish.
Viewing Kantian political theory as a whole, one sees a different view
of autonomy than that which has emerged in the autonomy debate. Rather
than focusing on autonomy as a right to be free from interference, Kant
sees autonomy as an innate capacity of each person, which imposes
obligations on us as members of an organized society. As such, Kantian
autonomy is not the right of atomistic individuals working toward their
own personal goals. Rather, autonomy recognizes that people are "inher-
ently social being[s who] . . . live and move and have their being in a
public forum.''42
B. Implications for a System of Free Expression
What would a system of laws designed to facilitate free expression
look like if based upon a Kantian conception of autonomy? While Part
III discusses many of the nuances of such a system as it exists in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, a broad sketch of some of the more
significant aspects of that system is appropriate here for a better under-
standing of its overall foundation.
As an initial matter, such a system would not focus on the rights of
the speaker qua speaker but on the integrity of our thought processes as
individuals and members of a community. Our thought processes are
integral to our capacity for deliberation and self-governance. Ensuring
their integrity is thus a necessary aspect of any system of laws built upon
Kantian autonomy. Given that we develop our thought processes by com-
municating with others, and thereby develop our capacity for self-govern-
ance, protecting public expression is especially important. As Kant asks,
"[H]ow much and how accurately would we think if we did not think, so
to speak, in community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts
and who communicate their thoughts to us[?]" 43 Thus, we should protect
42 Weinrib, supra note 32, at 41; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 260 (noting
that Kantian theory "insist[s] that we must think of our moral destiny as part of a larger
whole encompassing first all our fellow citizens and then all mankind"); Jeremy Waldron,
Kant's Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1566 (1996) ("[I]n the transition from
[Kant's] moral philosophy to political philosophy, Kant insists that we must now appreci-
ate that there are others in the world besides ourselves....").4 3 IMMANUEL KANT, WHAT IS ORIENTATION IN THINKING, reprinted in KANT: POLITI-
CAL WRITINGS, supra note 33, at 237, 247; see also IMMANUEL KANT, AN ANSWER TO
THE QUESTION: 'WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?,' reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS,
supra note 33, at 54, 55 (suggesting the need "to make public use of one's reason in all
matters"); HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 40 (Ronald
Beiner ed., 1982) (noting that Kant "believe[d] that the very faculty of thinking depends
on its public use; without 'the test of free and open examination,' no thinking and no
opinion-formation are possible. Reason is not made 'to isolate itself but to get into the
community with others."') (footnote omitted).
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those who publicly express themselves because of their contributions to
the development of the rational capacities of both the speaker and her
audience.44
Obviously, protection from overreaching state censorship is essential
to the public exercise of our rational faculties.45 A system of free expres-
sion based on Kantian autonomy, however, would not merely concern
itself with protection against government suppression. Because the State's
purpose is to preserve the dignity of its citizens, such a system would also
ensure that citizens use speech consistently with autonomy. The State can
and should regulate speech that, by attempting to override the thought
processes of other individuals, disrespects their rational capacities.4 6 Such
speech does not facilitate, but rather detracts from, the public exercise of
reason and is therefore the proper subject of the State's coercive powers.
Determining when speech is coercive is no easy task. The task is
made more difficult by the fact that the State must walk a fine line
between regulating the external and internal aspects of speech. The State
must regulate speech because of the coercive impact it has on our thought
processes, not because of any particular idea that is expressed. The ability
to test ideas through public communication is a necessary aspect of auton-
omy; we cannot relinquish it to the State or any other person. Deeming
speech coercive because the government or its citizens dislikes or finds
harmful the ideas expressed imposes an orthodoxy and cuts off debate in
an impermissible manner.
In sum, a system of free expression based on a Kantian notion of
autonomy involves more than the freedom of the speaker to speak as she
wishes. Rather, it involves the ability and responsibility of individuals, as
part of a community, to engage in dialogue in order to develop their
rational capacities.
44 See ARENDT, supra note 43, at 39 (noting that Kantian theory does not conceive of
the right to speak as merely "the right of an individual to express himself and his opinion
in order to be able to persuade others to share his viewpoint" but as a way to develop our
reasoning abilities).
45 Kant argued strongly for citizens' rights to express themselves, especially in matters
critical of government. See, e.g., KANT, THEORY & PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 85 (noting
that "freedom of the pen" is critical to safeguard the rights of citizens against the
government) (emphasis omitted).
46I base this argument on Kant's moral and political theory, but it is, to some extent,
my extension of his principles. Kant clearly argued against government suppression of
speech, but his views on regulation of private coercive speech are less developed.
Nevertheless, Kant's philosophy, especially his belief that laws permitting lying would
make a just State impossible, supports regulation of such speech. See IMMANUEL KANT,
ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE FROM ALTRUISTIC MOTIVES, reprinted in' CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 346 (Lewis W. Beck
trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1949).
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III. Autonomy as Reflected in the Structure of the Supreme Court's
Free Speech Jurisprudence
My argument that the Court's jurisprudence reflects an autonomy ration-
ale is subject to a few important caveats. First, I do not offer Kantian
autonomy as a universal rationale explaining all of the Court's free speech
jurisprudence. Indeed, there are so many intricacies to free speech doc-
trine that identifying a completely unifying principle may be impossible.47
Kantian autonomy, however, largely explains at least two of the major
"organizing principles" 48 of the Court's jurisprudence: the Court's review of
regulations for content, discrimination and its designation of certain speech
as low-value. 49 Moreover, Kantian autonomy can illuminate those areas of
jurisprudence on which the scholarly debate has concentrated.
Second, I do not assert that the Court has explicitly adopted Kantian
autonomy as the basis of its doctrinal organizing principles. Other than
Justice Brandeis's famous statement that "the final end of the State [is]
to make men free to develop their faculties, 50 few Justices have explicitly
invoked such a concept.51 Indeed, other factors arguably contradict my
47See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 3 (1988) ("The Court has not
fashioned a single, general theory which would explain all of its decisions...."); Post,
supra note 1, at 278 (noting that "first amendment doctrine... is a vast Sargasso Sea of
drifting and entangling values, theories, rules, exceptions, predilections").48The term "organizing principles" is Professor Williams's. See Susan H. Williams,
Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 616 (1991)
(defining "organizing principles as the multi-doctrinal themes the Supreme Court has
recently begun using to clarify and give structure to the confused 'doctrinal web'
surrounding First Amendment jurisprudence").49 Professor Williams would add the Court's public forum doctrine as a third pervasive
structure to the two.listed in the text. See id. at 616 n.2. To be sure, the Court's public
forum doctrine is a major tenet of its First Amendment jurisprudence. However, it adds
little to the analysis in this Article. The public forum doctrine is primarily designed to
ensure that speakers have access to public property while still maintaining reasonable
administration of government activities occurring on that property. Thus, in public fora-
property such as streets and parks that have traditionally been open to speech activities-
the Court generally applies its other traditional speech analyses. In other words, the Court
applies its content-based/content-neutral and low-value speech approaches to resolve
freedom of speech issues. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). However, in nonpublic fora-those which are not traditionally
associated with speech activities and in which the government has a greater interest in
managerial control such as prisons and fairgrounds-the Court gives wide deference to
decisions to restrict speech absent viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 46-49. While there
is room for disagreement regarding whether a forum should be deemed public or nonpublic
and whether the Court has been wise to allow the government so much latitude in
nonpublic fora, such issues are beyond the scope of this Article. For my purposes, the
public forum doctrine's importance is that it attempts to assure that all speakers have some
public outlet for speech and that it applies the other two organizing principles in public
fora. Both are consistent with notions of Kantian autonomy as discussed further in this
Part.
50Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
51 Only Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman explicitly relies upon
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argument. For example, several Justices have eschewed a jurisprudence
based on Kantian autonomy.52 In addition, to the extent the Court has
adopted an autonomy rationale, it has been hopelessly inconsistent, some-
times viewing the First Amendment as protecting speakers' rights53 and
sometimes as protecting listeners' rights.54
But the Court's manifestation of Kantian autonomy does not lie in
the Court's rhetoric or in the beliefs of independent Justices. My argument
is that the Court's overall structural approach and reasoning when resolv-
Kantian notions in the free speech context. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 (1961)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). A search for the term "Kant" in Westlaw's SCT and SCT-OLD
databases, which contain Supreme Court cases released for publication from 1790 to the
present, turned up seven other opinions which include citations to Immanuel Kant. See
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 752 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 697 n.9 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 665 n.41 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 581 n.10 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56, 68 n.14 (1972); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 261 n.11 (1962) (Clark, J.,
concurring); Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133, 134 (1915).52Justice Holmes, for example, was no fan of Kant's political theory, instead arguing
that the law should recognize that people act on "justifiable self-preference." OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41, 41-44 (1923); see also David M. Rabban, The
Emergence of Modem First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1267-83
(1983) (discussing Justice Holmes's jurisprudence and his "disdain" of a Kantian rationale
for the law). Indeed, Justice Holmes's reference to speakers as "poor and puny anonymi-
ties," even in his opinions arguing for protection of speech, implies far less respect for
human dignity than a Kantian rationale. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Of the current Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist is the most obvious anti-Kantian
candidate. His willingness to uphold even the most paternalistic regulations of speech, see,
e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (upholding government
regulation banning recipients of federal funds from counseling about the availability of
abortion as a method of family planning); Posadas de P. R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478
U.S. 328 (1986) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (upholding Puerto Rico statute banning casino advertis-
ing aimed at its citizens), is clearly inconsistent with a Kantian rationale. See Christina
E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v.
Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724, 1764 (1995) (arguing
that Posadas and Rust are inconsistent with an autonomy rationale).53See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) ("IT]he concept that government
may restrict the speech of some ... in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269 (1964) ("'[lit is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind."') (quoting Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941)); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1949)
(characterizing the right as the speaker's freedom to "express his views on matters which
he considers to be of interest to himself and others").54See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978) ("The First
Amendment rejects the 'highly paternalistic' approach of statutes ... which restrict what
the people may hear.") (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976) (noting the importance to the
consumer of the "free flow of... information" regarding consumer drug prices); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (upholding access rules pertaining to
broadcasters and noting that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount").
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ing free speech issues is remarkably consistent with a Kantian ideal.
Moreover, explicit recognition of a relationship between Kantian auton-
omy and the Court's free speech jurisprudence might alleviate some of
the Court's doctrinal and rhetorical inconsistencies. The remainder of this
Part outlines the most critical aspects of free speech doctrine insofar as
they relate to Kantian autonomy.
A. The Court's Distinction Between Content-Based and
Content-Neutral Regulations of Speech
The Court's approach to content-based and content-neutral regula-
tions of speech distinguishes between government regulations that "limit
communication because of the message it conveys" 55 (content-based regu-
lations) and government regulations that affect speech but are not aimed
at its content (content-neutral regulations).5 6 The Court heavily disfavors
content-based regulations, striking them down unless the government can
show that the law is narrowly drawn to meet a compelling state interest.
5 7
5 5 Stone, supra note 8, at 47. Such regulations often restrict the expression of a
particular viewpoint (e.g., a law restricting only anti-abortion speech), but they may also
regulate the discussion of entire subject matters, such as a law restricting all discussion
of abortion in public places.
56Two primary forms of such content-neutral restrictions exist. First, laws may aim
to regulate expression but do so in a way that has nothing to do with the message
conveyed, such as a law banning the use of amplified sound-trucks in private residential
areas). See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (holding that the regulation of sound
trucks was constitutional). Second, such laws may aim at regulating conduct but have an
incidental effect on expression, such as a law banning the burning of draft cards. See
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding conviction of defendant for
burning his draft card on the grounds that the government's interest in assuring the
continuing availabity of draft cards was sufficient to override defendant's claim that his
act was protected as symbolic speech). Prior to the Court's decision in Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding that a National Park Service
regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks did not violate the First Amendment,
though applied to prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in a park where a permitted
round-the-clock demonstration intended to call attention to the plight of the homeless was
in progress), the two forms of content-neutral regulations were thought to be judged under
different standards. The Court upheld regulations aimed directly at expression under a
standard similar to the one enunciated in Clark. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
177 (1983) (noting that the Court will uphold time, place, and manner regulations of
speech if they are "content-neutral,... narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication" (citing Perry Educ.
Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983))). The Court, however,
upheld regulations aimed at conduct but incidentally affecting expression only if they were
within the constitutional power of the government, furthered an important or substantial
government interest that was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and were no
broader than essential to further the government interest. See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
377. In recent years, however, the Court has made clear that the Clark test applies in both
situations. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1989). For criticism
of the Court's current approach to content-neutral regulations, see Williams, supra note
49, at 636-54.57 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
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In contrast, the Court reviews content-neutral regulations under the more
lenient standard of intermediate scrutiny, upholding the regulations as
long as they "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, . . . are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and . .. leave open ample alternative channels for communica-
tion of the information 58 The differing treatment of content-neutral and
content-based regulations and the differing standards applied to each reflect
that aspect of Kantian autonomy that requires the State to respect our
thought processes.
The fact that content-based laws violate Kantian autonomy is best
reflected in the purposes for which so many of those laws are enacted.59
For example, the government often regulates speech because it does not
trust individuals to make correct decisions if exposed to certain informa-
tion.60 Distrust of the ability of citizens to make decisions is antithetical
to autonomy,61 and the Court has invalidated numerous content-based laws
that have such paternalistic justifications.62 Also, government officials
U.S. 105 (1991) (invalidating law requiring any entity contracting with a criminal to
publish a depiction of the crime to turn over income under the contract to the Crime
Victims Board); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding unconstitutional
university regulation barring religious organizations from using university facilities for
religious purposes); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating
law banning all picketing except labor picketing near schools).
5 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, quoted in Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523-24 (1994) (examining whether, in light
of Clark, an injunction against anti-abortion protesters should be prohibited as motivated
by a content-based purpose).59 See Williams, supra note 49, at 618 (noting that the Court and scholars alike believe
that "the special danger in cases of content discrimination lies in the fact that the
government's purpose is connected to the 'communicative impact' of the speech regu-
lated").60See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 768 (1976) (dealing with State fear that information regarding drug prices
might adversely influence consumer decision making); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 371 (1927) (dealing with State fear that advocacy of communism would prompt
people to attempt to overthrow the government).
61 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 31 [hereinafter Fallon,
Harassment] ("To censor speech on the ground that the listener could not be trusted to
evaluate its content would . . . affront the listener's autonomy in most cases."). Professor
Fallon specifically bases his argument on what he calls "ascriptive" autonomy, id. at 30,
a concept that he links directly to Kant. See Fallon, Autonomy, supra note 29, at 878. He
further believes that "claims of ascriptive autonomy predominate in First Amendment
doctrines dealing with the public forum, with governmental regulation of the traditional
media, and with people's use of their homes and similarly private facilities to express
themselves uninhibitedly." Fallon, Harassment, supra at 36.62See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1979) ("[T]he people
in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the
relative merits of conflicting arguments . . . . [I]f there be any danger that the people
cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced ... it is a danger contemplated
by the Framers of the First Amendment."); Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
at 770 ("It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information,
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often justify content-based restrictions by arguing that they protect citi-
zens from offensive speech,63 under the premise that citizens ought not to
have to deal with unpleasant or abhorrent words and ideas. Attempts to
protect citizens from disagreeable speech treat adults as children and deny
their capabilities to withstand or counter unpleasant events. Further, they
allow those holding a dominant viewpoint in society to silence or restrict
the dissemination of views with which they disagree, thereby making the
government a vehicle for private citizens' disrespect for the thought proc-
esses of others. Not surprisingly, the Court has also found this justification
wanting. 64 Finally, the government may enact content-based restrictions
simply because it disapproves of the speaker's point of view. 65 Such
restrictions amount to governmental attempts to substitute its thoughts for
those of its citizens, in effect determining for us which views are right
and wrong. Again, the Court has recognized that such justifications are
illegitimate.66 Thus, by protecting against the improper motivations gen-
erally underlying content-based regulations of speech,67 the Court's doc-
trine reflects a consciousness of our inalienable dignity and a desire to
protect this dignity from coercive government incursions.
The Court's more lenient approach to content-neutral standards simi-
larly fits within a Kantian autonomy rationale, as such restrictions do not
usually impinge upon our innate dignity in the same manner as content-
based limitations. Improper government motivation is less of a danger
with content-neutral restrictions because, by definition, these regulations
and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for
us"); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 189, 212 (1983) (noting that the Court has "long embraced an
'antipaternalistic' understanding of the first amendment").
63 In Cohen v. California, California argued that it could "legitimately act.., in order
to protect the sensitive from otherwise unavoidable exposure to appellant's crude form of
protest." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
64 See id. at 24, 26 (reversing defendant's conviction for disturbing the peace based
upon his wearing a jacket with a "Fuck the Draft" logo).65See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989) (discussing statute banning
flag desecration in circumstances where the State believed "such conduct will lead people
to believe that the flag does not stand for nationhood ... or that the concepts reflected in
the flag do not in fact exist"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919)
(discussing federal statute prohibiting citizens from provoking or encouraging resistance
toward the United States).66 See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418 (striking down Texas's flag-burning statute);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (striking down
law prohibiting public utilities from using monthly bill inserts addressing "controversial
issues of public policy").
67The government obviously does not enact all content-based laws with improper
motives. However, the likelihood of such motives has led the Court to require compelling
justifications for all content-based regulations. Erecting a wall around speech in order to
protect the integrity of our thought processes is consistent with a Kantian autonomy
rationale. I disagree with Professor Stone who, while recognizing the strong distrust of
government running through the Court's free speech jurisprudence, specifically eschews
an autonomy rationale with respect to that distrust. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1173.
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must be justified without reference to the content of expression. In the
context of a law regulating the decibel levels of sound trucks, for example,
such a justification might be that trucks blaring their messages in private
residential neighborhoods are significant invasions of privacy.68 That justifica-
tion is relatively neutral, applies to all speech regardless of its message,
and leaves open other opportunities of expression. Thus, the government
does not appear to be regulating speech in a manner designed to coerce
our thought processes.69 Of course, ostensibly impartial justifications for
content-neutral regulations can be pretextual: the government's real mo-
tive behind the law could be disapproval of the speaker's viewpoint.70
Nevertheless, much of the time, the government's neutral justifications are
legitimate efforts to balance expression with other important concerns,
such as order or privacy. Furthermore, the Court does not merely rubber
stamp content-neutral laws but applies intermediate scrutiny in order to
ensure that content-neutral laws do not suppress speech inappropriately.
To the extent that content-neutral regulations have a severe impact on
viewpoints or speakers, the Court has been willing to strike down such
regulations.
71
Thus, the Court's approach to content discrimination is consistent
with the Kantian desire to ensure the integrity of thought processes inte-
6SSee Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81 (1949) (stating that purpose of ordinance
banning use of sound trucks was to protect people from unreasonable noise and interfer-
ence while in the privacy of their homes or businesses).69Content-neutral regulations may have a much greater impact on the total quantity
of speech than content-based regulations because they have the potential to restrict the
free flow of information far more than restrictions on a single viewpoint. Thus, one could
argue that such restrictions should be at least as disfavored as content-based restrictions,
See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 113, 128 (1981). From the perspective of Kantian autonomy, however, such an impact
is less of a problem than government attempts to impose its will upon its citizens, as is
the case with content-based restrictions. Thus, content-neutral regulations are properly
reviewed under a lesser standard. Moreover, the Court has shown a willingness to strike
down even content-neutral laws that severely limit communication. See, e.g., City of Ladue
v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (striking down law banning homeowners from displaying
signs on their property); see also Stone, supra note 61, at 190 & n.5 (discussing cases in
which the Court has found content-neutral laws unconstitutional because of the severe
restriction on communication). In this sense, the Court's jurisprudence is consistent with
the Kantian desire to ensure some public exercise of reason. See supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text.70In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for example, it appeared that the
legislature's motives in criminalizing draft card burning were far less related to the
ostensible goal of maintaining easy administration of the selective service system than
they were to "put[ting] a stop to [a] particular form of antiwar protest, which [Congress]
deemed extraordinarily contemptible and vicious:' Dean A. Alfange, Jr., The Draft-Card
Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 15.
71 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 146-47 (1943) (striking
down municipal ban on distribution of door-to-door circulars because the method of
distribution was essential to poorly financed and often unpopular causes); see also Stone,
supra note 8, at 81-86 (discussing the Court's approach to cases in which viewpoints are
negatively impacted by content-neutral regulations).
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gral to our capacity for autonomy. The Court's approach to content-based
and content-neutral regulations, however, reflects only one aspect of Kan-
tian autonomy-protection from State interference with our thought proc-
esses. One sees the other aspect of Kantian autonomy-regulating private
citizens' attempted coercion of our thought processes-in the Court's
approach to low-value speech.
B. The Court's Approach to Low-Value Speech
Although its First Amendment jurisprudence is generally protective
of speech, the Court has never assumed that all speech is of equal value.
Instead, the Court has created certain categories of low-value speech that
it believes deserve less protection than other speech. Examples of such
low-value speech are: speech that incites unlawful activity; fighting words;
obscenity; and, to some extent, commercial speech and libel. Unfortu-
nately, the Court has provided little guidance with respect to what speech
should be considered low-value.72 Its only consistent statement is that
low-value speech is "no essential part of any exposition of ideas and is
of such slight social value as a step to the truth that any benefit that may
be derived from it is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."73 That statement, although explaining why the Court has
created categories of low-value speech, does not explain when speech falls
into those categories. Not surprisingly, scholars have widely criticized the
Court for creating low-value categories which many believe have no place
in First Amendment jurisprudence.74 In addition, the Court's failure to
72 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 125 ("[T]he Court has yet to offer anything
like a clear principle to unify the categories of speech that it treats as 'low value."');
Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REv. 297, 334-35 (1995)
(noting that the Court has never "explained what characteristics it considers in determining
the value of speech"); Stone, supra note 61, at 194 (determining that "[tihe precise factors"
used by the Court to determine when speech is low-value "remain somewhat obscure").73 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1948). The Court's description
of speech as having no social value first appeared with respect to its fighting words
doctrine. However, the Chaplinsky language, or variants thereof, has appeared in almost
all of the low-value speech cases. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957) ("[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance"); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
256-57 (1952) ("[L]ibelous ...utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas."); Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (noting that "purely commercial
advertising" does not amount to the "exercise ...of communicating information and
disseminating opinion").74 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 326 (1970)
(arguing that the Court's approach to low-value speech is incompatible with First Amend-
ment principles); STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
44 (1990) ("[T]he very concept of low-value speech is an embarrassment to first amend-
ment orthodoxy.") (footnote omitted); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle
in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 31 (1975) (arguing that the Court's
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define specifically when speech becomes low-value has engendered much
debate over the salient characteristics of such speech.75
Despite scholars' concerns, there is a unifying principle to the Court's
low-value speech analysis that also illuminates its legitimate place in free
speech jurisprudence. A close examination of the Court's approach to the
various categories of low-value speech reveals that it is consistent with a
Kantian notion of autonomy. Specifically, the Court has attempted to carve
out as low-value speech that disrespects other citizens' thought processes,
thus making it a proper subject for State regulation. 76 Furthermore, and
consistent with Kantian autonomy, the Court has made a strong effort to
limit State regulation only to speech that invades rather than appeals to
our rationality. The remainder of this Part examines the Court's doctrine
in five specific areas of low-value speech: incitement of illegal action;
fighting words; obscenity; libel; and commercial speech.
approach is "radically inconsistent with the principle of equal liberty of expression"). But
see SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 126 ("[A]ny well-functioning system of free expression
must ultimately distinguish between different kinds of speech by reference to their
centrality to the First Amendment guarantee."); Stone, supra note 61, at 195 n.24 ("The
low value theory . . . is an essential concomitant of an effective system of free expres-
sion:').75See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 554 (1989)
(suggesting several alternative theories for the Court's value distinctions among types of
speech); Shaman, supra note 71, at 333-37 (discussing Court's approach to low-value
speech and commentators' attempts to make sense of it); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography
and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 603-04 (setting forth four-factor analysis
for determining when speech is low-value).76Few, if any, scholars have maintained that an autonomy rationale underlies the
Court's low-value speech jurisprudence. Indeed, given the Court's rhetoric regarding
"order and morality," I suspect that many scholars would agree with Professor Sunstein's
statement that "any autonomy-based approach would make it difficult or impossible to
distinguish between different categories of speech." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 303
(footnote omitted). However, at least two scholars argue that some government regulation
of private speakers is consistent with an autonomy rationale, although not necessarily with
a Kantian one. Professor Strauss argues that under an autonomy rationale one can regulate
some coercive or manipulative speech. Strauss, supra note 1, at 362-68. Professor Baker
similarly recognizes that an autonomy rationale may allow regulation of coercive speech.
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 55-56 (1989).
Both scholars' theories differ from mine. Professor Strauss, although arguing that we
should be able to regulate some coercive and manipulative speech in the name of
autonomy, apparently does not believe that the Court's current low-value speech jurispru-
dence is firmly grounded in such a rationale. Strauss, supra note 1, at 361-63 (noting
libertarian bias of Court's "persuasion principle" and suggesting alterations to allow
regulation of private, coercive speech). Professor Baker, although arguing that coercive
speech can be regulated consistent with an autonomy rationale, nevertheless appears to
characterize autonomy largely as a speaker's right. BAKER, supra, at 54, 59 ("[T]o the
extent that speech is involuntary, is not chosen by the speaker, the speech act does not
involve the self-realization or self-fulfillment of the speaker .... [Respect for autonomy]
is belied unless each person has a right to decide on and employ speech ... for realizing
substantive values and visions.').
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1. Incitement of Illegal Action
The Court's doctrine regarding incitement provides an excellent il-
lustration of the autonomy rationale in its low-value speech jurisprudence.
According to the Court, the government can suppress speech advocating
unlawful conduct only if "it is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action";77 mere
"abstract teaching" of the moral necessity of such action will not sustain
punishment.78 For example, the State may punish speech designed to whip
an angry mob into a violent and destructive frenzy, but it may not punish
a political rally in which the speaker advocates violence as a tool for
revolution.
The Court's requirement of imminent lawless action is easily justified
as based upon concern for autonomy. Speech designed to incite immediate
violence or lawless action does not appeal to our thought processes. 79
Rather, it disrespects our rationality and is designed to elicit an unthink-
ing, animalistic response.80 Thus, the Court's test protects our collective
thought processes and imposes consequences on speakers who violate the
freedom of citizens to think rationally. Acceptable state action, however,
does not include punishing mere advocacy of unlawful action. Speech
designed to persuade people to violate the law is not coercive in the same
sense as speech designed to incite imminent lawlessness; the former
contributes to rather than detracts from our deliberative processes, even
if the idea advocated is perceived as undesirable. Punishment of such
speech is an unreasonable impediment to our public exercise of reason,
as the Court has recognized numerous times.81 Thus, the Court's incite-
77Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (striking down Ohio criminal
syndicalism statute); see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (reversing
conviction for disorderly conduct because defendant's statements at an antiwar rally were
"nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time"); Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (reversing conviction for threatening
President because defendant's words were merely "a kind of very crude offensive method
of stating a political opposition to the President").7 8 Id.
79The distinction between coercive and persuasive speech is not easily drawn and
defining such a distinction is well beyond the scope of this Article. That the Court believes
the distinction can be made, however, supports my argument that its jurisprudence is
consistent with Kantian autonomy. For a view on when speech is coercive, see BAKER,
supra note 75, at 54-69.
8°See Strauss, supra note 1, at 339 (arguing that speech inciting imminent lawless
action "bypass[es] the rational processes of deliberation"). Judge Learned Hand originally
made the distinction between incitement, which is a "trigger[] of action" and advocacy,
which is a "key[] of persuasion." Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.
1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
81 See, e.g., Hess, 414 U.S. at 108; Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 685 (1959) (striking down state law
requiring the denial of licenses to show films which portray "acts of sexual immorality
... as desirable").
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ment doctrine maintains a narrow line to protect our rationality from both
private and state interference.
2. Fighting Words
One can view the Court's approach to fighting words-"those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace" 82 -in the same vein. In the Court's eyes, such words do "not
in any proper sense communicat[e] ... information or opinion"; 3 rather,
they are more akin to physical assaults. 84 As such, fighting words do not
appeal to our rational or deliberative capacities. They are instead designed
to induce us to react violently and without thinking, much as a punch in
the mouth induces the victim to respond in an unthinking manner.
The fact that the Court refuses to consider offensive speech as being
low in value further bolsters the autonomy rationale argument. In order
to qualify as fighting words, speech must "have a direct tendency to cause
acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is ad-
dressed "' 85 The State cannot ban speech that does not rise to this level
simply because people are offended or angered by the ideas expressed.8 6
Distasteful or abhorrent speech, while often unpleasant or even painful,
does not coerce or manipulate others to react in an immediately violent
or irrational manner. In fact, offensive speech often expresses emotions
that persuade others regarding the speaker's point of view87 or at least
invite debate.88 Thus, as with its incitement doctrine, the Court has at-
tempted to distinguish between speech that invades the dignity of others,
for which the speaker must bear the consequences, and speech that must
be free from state interference in order to protect our thought processes
from state coercion.
82 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).831d. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
84See id. (characterizing fighting words as "personal abuse"); see also David S.
Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom of Speech, 35
MD. L. REv. 555, 588 (1976) (noting that fighting words are "similar in nature to a
physical attack").
85 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451, 461-62 (1987).86See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (striking down Texas law prohib-
iting defacement of the flag in a manner that would "seriously offend" other persons);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (refusing to uphold defendant's breach of
peace conviction based upon the offensiveness of "Fuck the Draft" logo).
87See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25-26; see also Strauss, supra note 1, at 342-43 (noting
that offensive speech may be persuasive and discussing limits on government regulation
of such speech).
88See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408-09 ("Our precedents ... recognize that a principal
'function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."') (quoting Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
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3. Obscenity
The Court's obscenity doctrine is also consistent with Kantian auton-
omy. In Roth v. United States,89 the Court held that obscenity did not enjoy
First Amendment protection because it is "utterly without redeeming so-
cial importance."90 In so holding, the Court defined obscenity as "material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." 91 Sig-
nificantly, the Roth Court took great pains to distinguish obscenity from
portrayals of sex expressing "ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance,"92 including unorthodox, controversial, or hateful ideas,
which the Court believed should enjoy full constitutional protection. By
requiring that obscene material have a "prurient" appeal, the Court's
jurisprudence targets expression that is intended to appeal to our physical
rather than our mental capacities, just as fighting words are like a physical
assault rather than speech.93 The Court's attempt to distinguish speech that
disrespects our thought processes from sexually oriented speech that nev-
ertheless appeals to our rational nature is analogous to the Court's line
drawing with incitement and fighting words. Both distinctions allow the
State to protect against and punish private interference with our delibera-
tive capacities while still maintaining unfettered dialogue, even on topics
that some might find uncomfortable.
Claiming that the Court's approach to obscenity is consistent with
Kantian autonomy is not without controversy. Three potential counterar-
guments are especially important in that respect. First, many scholars
contend that the Court's determination that obscenity has no value actu-
ally violates our autonomy by imposing a dominant viewpoint regarding
acceptable lifestyles. 94 Like these scholars, I find troubling the notion that
89354 U.S. 476 (1957).
901d. at 484.
911d. at 487. The Court has since refined the Roth standard. Currently, it defines
obscenity as that material which appeals to a prurient interest, depicts sexual conduct in
a patently offensive manner, and lacks serious, redeeming social value. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).92Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.93See EMERSON, supra note 74, at 496 (noting that an obscene communication
"imposed upon a person contrary to his wishes, has all the characteristics of a physical
assault"); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv.
601, 625 (1990) (noting the similarity of the "prurient interest" and "fighting words"
standards in the Court's determination that speech is low-value); Frederick Schauer, Speech
and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Consti-
tutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 926 (1979) (arguing that, by definition, obscenity
"is sex" and not speech).94 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of
Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. Rav. 1564, 1565 (1988) (criticizing suppression
of obscenity as based in "moralistic paternalism") (citing J. FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS 189 (1985)); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of
Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1137, 1182 (1983)
(noting that "obscene pornography constitutes a political-moral vision"); David A.J.
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obscenity is worthless, but the debate over obscenity's actual value is
beyond the scope of this Article. The important fact is that the Court has
attempted to carve out only a small portion of material for suppression
based upon its belief that such information invades our thought processes.
Most sexually oriented speech remains untouched. In fact, the Court has
gone out of its way to protect such speech when it believes the govern-
ment to be engaging in unreasonable censorship.95 Thus, regardless of
whether obscenity actually is valueless, the Court's reasoning is consistent
with a Kantian notion of autonomy.
Second, one could argue that the Court's current standard for judging
obscenity belies my argument regarding Kantian autonomy. While the
Roth standard characterized obscenity as without social value,96 current
doctrine defines obscenity as that material which appeals to a "prurient"
interest and that merely lacks "serious" social value.97 Thus, one could
conclude that the Court's current obscenity jurisprudence is not limited
to speech which invades our thought processes. While the Court appears
to have relaxed its standard regarding social value, its maintenance of the
"prurient" interest requirement in both definitions nevertheless suggests
that it is at least trying to limit state regulation to speech that in some
way coerces or disrespects our rationality.
Finally, one could argue that the Court's heavy reliance on history
and accepted social practice98 in formulating its obscenity doctrine is
inconsistent with an autonomy rationale. To be sure, history played a large
role in the Court's decision not to accord obscenity First Amendment
protection. But the Court's modern definition clearly deviates from his-
torical definitions of obscenity, which encompassed far more literature,
art, and other useful information than the Court's current definition.99
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. RaV. 45, 82 (1974) (noting that there "is no reason whatsoever to
believe that the freedom to determine the sexual contents of one's communications or to
be an audience to such communications is not as fundamental to . . self-mastery as the
freedom to decide upon any other communicative contents").95American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (striking down as viewpoint discrimination an antipornogra-
phy ordinance banning graphic and sexually explicit portrayals of women as inferiors or
subordinates).
96See supra note 88 and accompanying text.97See supra note 91.
98 In ruling that obscenity was "outside the protection intended for speech and press,"
the Roth Court relied heavily on the fact that obscenity was illegal in most states at the
time Congress ratified the Constitution. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483. For a more thorough review
of the treatment of obscenity throughout history, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 904-08 (2d ed. 1988).99See, e.g., United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 709 (1934)
(Manton, J., dissenting) ("Who can doubt the obscenity of [Joyce's classic novel?] ...
[T]he test of obscenity.., is whether the tendency of the matter is to deprave and corrupt
the morals of those whose minds are open to such influences, and into whose hands a
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Thus, the Court's attempt to narrow the definition of obscenity to that
which has a "prurient" appeal, although influenced by history, is at least
partly compatible with autonomy concerns.
4. Libel
Although the Court originally maintained that "libelous . ..utter-
ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas," 100 it currently gives
substantial protection to false statements of fact regarding public officials
and public figures.101 The Court's extension of First Amendment protec-
tion to such statements, however, had little to do with a belief that they
have any value as speech. Indeed, the Court has explicitly stated that such
statements have little, if any, First Amendment value. 0 2 Rather, the desire
to avoid chilling potential speakers by building a protective wall around
speech on public issues, especially criticism of the government, largely
drove the Court's decisions. 10 3 Such reasoning is consistent with a Kantian
view of autonomy.
The Court's decision that libelous utterances are valueless protects
our thought processes from private coercion. As Professor Strauss has
noted:
publication of this sort may fall."). Professor Rabban has noted that contemporary judges
expansively interpreted the term "obscene" to include materials "opposing legal regulation
of marriage and . . . providing sexually explicit information about contraception!' David
M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free
Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REv. 47, 53 (1992). Indeed, Anthony Comstock,
the father of an act which prohibited using the interstate mails to deliver "obscene"
materials, made no distinction between "commercial pornography and serious works about
sex by libertarian radicals who expressed controversial views." Id. at 58.
100Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952).
101 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (holding that First
Amendment requires public official seeking damages for libel prove that statement was
made "with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not"); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (plurality opinion) (holding that Sullivan
standard applies only to "speech on 'matters of public concern"') (citations omitted); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974) (applying Sullivan standard to false
statement of facts made about public figures).
102The Sullivan Court originally intimated that false statements of fact have some
value. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 ("Even a false statement may be deemed to make
a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error."') (citations omitted). In
later cases, however, the Court retreated from this statement to hold that libelous statements
have little or no value. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)
("False statements of fact are particularly valueless ..."'); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340
("[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.").
103See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 52 (noting that the Court's actual malice rule provides
"breathing space" for free expression); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (discussing the fear that
strict libel laws would deter true speech as well as false statements of fact).
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Lying is the clearest case of ... coercion-like, autonomy-invad-
ing manipulation . . . . When a speaker tells a lie in order to
influence the listener's behavior, the metaphor of commandeer-
ing the listener's mind, and making it serve the speaker's ends
instead of the listener's, seems especially appropriate. The speaker
really does inject her own false information into the thought
processes of the listener for the purpose of making those proc-
esses produce the outcome that the speaker desires. 04
In other words, false statements of fact are designed not to persuade or
appeal to our rational senses but to override them and unreasonably
damage the libeled person's reputation as a result. 05 Consequently, we
can hold persons making those statements responsible for such invasions.
Some might argue, however, that the Court's refusal to extend pro-
tection of defamation law to public figures and officials except in extreme
circumstances argues against an autonomy rationale. After all, if lies
invade our thought processes, why should lies about public officials and
figures be any different? The answer rests in the issue of seditious libel
that played an important role in Sullivan.0 6 In that case, an Alabama
official used libel law not to protect a personal reputation but to shut down
criticism of the government by members of the civil rights movement.107
In such a circumstance, libel law did not protect autonomy from invasion
by private citizens but became a tool of the government to suppress
speech that it disliked. Recognizing the dangers of such misuse and its
chilling effect on speech, t08 the Court established its requirement that
public officials show actual malice'0 9 before recovering damages. 10 Thus,
one can view the actual malice standard as the Court's attempt to walk
the same fine line it has walked in other low-value speech areas. It
'04Strauss, supra note 1, at 366.
105 In this way, libelous utterances are similar to fighting words. See TRaBE, supra note
98, § 12-12, at 861 (noting that "libelous speech [has long been] regarded as a form of
personal assault"). Professor Post comes to a similar conclusion noting that defamatory
communications violate what he calls the "rules of civility" because they "threaten . . .
the self of the defamed person (causing, among other things, symptoms of 'personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering')" Post, supra note 93, at 618 (quoting
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350).
106New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'
07 See id.; see also ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW 5-45 (1991) (reviewing the
social and historical context in which the Sullivan case arose); TRIBE, supra note 98,
§ 12-12, at 863 ("[T]he inescapable conclusion [in light of Sullivan's lawsuit] was that
Alabama's 'white establishment' had taken the opportunity to punish The New York Times
for its support of civil rights activists: the South was prepared to use the law of libel to
stifle black opposition to racial segregation.").08 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276-79.
109The Court defined "actual malice" as statements made with knowledge or reckless
disregard of their falsity. See id. at 280.
'"'See id. at 279-80.
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attempts to preserve our deliberative capacities from invasive lies by
imposing liability for such lies but also seeks to keep the government
from suppressing disagreeable speech. 1
5. Commercial Speech
As with libel, commercial speech' 2 was once thought to have no
value113 but now enjoys substantial First Amendment protection.' 14 Insofar
as Kantian .autonomy is concerned, the Court's decisions are directly
aimed at State coercion of our thought processes. Indeed, antipathy to-
ward State paternalism has been a central focus of the Court's commercial
speech decisions.' .5 Yet there is also an element of protecting our thought
processes from private coercion. The Court has made it clear that States
are free to regulate false, misleading, and deceptive advertising, stressing
I" IThe extension of the actual malice standard to public figures is somewhat problem-
atic in this respect. Public figures clearly do not pose the same danger with respect to
seditious libel as do public officials. In addition, the Court has been inconsistent in
applying its rationale in such cases. Originally, at least one member of the Court based
his extension of the actual malice standard to public figures partly on the notion that
"[i]ncreasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors
are blurred" and that public figures, while not holding office, are "nevertheless intimately
involved in the resolution of important public questions?' Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring). In more recent years, however,
the Court has based its extension on other rationales: the ability of public figures to defend
themselves against libelous statements and the voluntary nature of their participation in
public issues. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974). Even here,
though, the Court has noted-that "public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved?'
Id. at 345 (emphasis added). One could conclude, then, that even with public figures, the
Court is concerned with a powerful group of people attempting to suppress newsworthy
speech with which they disagree.
112The Court generally defines commercial speech as that which does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction' Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
"13See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
114See Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 762 (holding that commercial
speech is not so removed from the exposition of ideas as to completely lack First
Amendment protection).
115The Virginia Citizens Consumer'Council Court soundly rejected the State's argu-
ment that consumers might act against their interests if given drug price information,
noting that "[i]t is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment
makes for us.' Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 770. Just this year, the
Court reaffirmed its antipaternalism sentiment in the commercial speech context. See
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996) ("The First Amendment
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good."); see also Strauss, supra note 1, at
343-45 (implicating an anitpaternalistic rationale by describing the Court's refusal to
regulate commercial speech that may "persuade people to do things that are harmful to
[them].").
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that "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise has never been pro-
tected for its own sake 1 16 As with libelous statements, the Court's pro-
nouncement reflects a desire to protect against invasive lies and deception
that attempt to override rather than appeal to our thought processes. As
with other areas of low-value speech, however, the Court has drawn a line
between acceptable government regulation of lies and unacceptable at-
tempts to regulate thoughts.
C. Kantian Autonomy and the Court's Free Speech Jurisprudence
Thus far, I have argued that the structure of the Court's First Amend-
ment jurisprudence is consistent with a Kantian autonomy rationale, al-
though not in the narrow sense espoused by many scholars. Although the
Court's doctrine clearly presumes a sphere of liberty from state regulation,
the focus of most scholars' autonomy arguments, its doctrine regarding
low-value speech shows that the right to say what we wish is not the only
aspect of autonomy encompassed IN the First Amendment. Instead, no-
tions of autonomy impose upon all of us an enforceable responsibility not
to invade the thought processes of others by using speech in a coercive
manner.
What conclusions can we draw regarding the fact that the Court's
decisions are consistent with Kant's theory of autonomy? First, thinking
of autonomy as encompassing liberty and responsibility reveals that the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is about dialogue. Autonomy is
not about atomistic, selfish individuals but about people with different
ideas and strong disagreements coming together as members of a commu-
nity to discuss issues. 17 That discussion need not be passionless," 8 but it
must not be coercive if we are to maintain our status as autonomous
individuals in a civilized society.
116 Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
"
7 Like Kant, at least one modem commentator has noted that "[s]peech ... is the
process by which we think together." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63
FOReDHAM L. REV. 971, 984 (1995). Professor Post makes a similar argument, noting that
"[tlraditional First Amendment doctrine guarantees that democratic dialogue will remain
continuously available to the potential contributions of its individual participants. Auton-
omy, properly understood, signifies that within the sphere of public discourse and with
regard to the suppression of speech the state must always regard collective identity as
necessarily open-ended:' Post, supra note 12, at 1122. His reasoning appears to apply to
citizens' attempts to cut off dialogue as well. The Court's First Amendment doctrine
ensures that our continuing discussion as a community is safe from both government and
private coercion.
"
5 As Professor Sherry has pointed out, "pure ratiocination is not the only form that
reasoning can take:' Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEo. L.J. 453, 455 (1996).
Rather, reason has many components, including, even during the Enlightenment period in
which Kant wrote, a practical one. See id. at 455-57 & n.7.
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Second, the Court's jurisprudence acknowledges that some issues are
better left to a sphere of moral obligations. The idea that the First Amend-
ment has something to do with moral obligations might seem odd given
that, textually, its concerns are clearly legal-i.e., it is specifically di-
rected toward determining the acceptability of laws regulating speech.
However, the Court's attempt to walk the fine line of protecting society
from coercive private speech without allowing government censorship
involves an element of moral rather than legal obligation. For example,
while the Court is willing to allow criminal punishment of fighting words,
it will not punish speech merely because we are offended by it. Fighting
words may be offensive but that is not why the State may regulate them.
Instead, it may regulate fighting words because they go beyond being
offensive ideas and invade our thought processes by instigating an un-
thinking, physical response. Such words are appropriate for legal regula-
tion. But offensive speech, although we may disagree with it, conveys an
idea. To allow the State to suppress it is to abdicate our moral responsi-
bility to discuss our disagreements and try to resolve them. Only indi-
viduals living in a community can come to a determination of what is
right and wrong. In this sense, although the First Amendment (and the
rhetoric of the Court's opinions) is couched in terms of law, it does
recognize an element of moral obligation with respect to speech.
IV. Viewing Hate Speech Through the Lens of Kantian Autonomy
This new understanding of autonomy may be able to resolve the
apparent conflict between autonomy and other values that lies at the
core of the scholarly debate. Although the autonomy debate has taken
place in several contexts,119 I focus only on hate speech, defined as
"expression that abuses or degrades others on account of their racial,
ethnic or religious identity."' 20 I do so because the controversy over hate
speech regulation has been a dominant presence in both scholarly 21 and
119See supra notes 5-7" and accompanying text.
120 Steven J. Heyman, Introduction: Hate Speech Regulation and the Theory of Free
Expression, in 1 HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION, ix (Steven J. Heyman ed., 1996).
I have used Professor Heyman's definition mainly for simplicity's sake. Although hate
speech encompasses far more than ethnic and religious hatred, much of the debate has
taken place in that context.
121 For a review of articles published prior to 1991, see Post, supra note 1, at 267 n.5.
For a sampling of more recent articles on hate speech, see Akil Reed Amar, The Case of
the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. Rv. 124 (1992); John
M. Blim, Undoing Our Selves: The Error of Sacrificing Speech in the Quest for Equality,
56 OHIO ST. L.J. 427 (1995); Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and
Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82
CAL. L. REV. 871 (1994); Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public
Discourse in America, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1135 (1994); Alon Harel, Bigotry,
Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of Unprotected Speech, 65 S. CAL. L.
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public 122 debate and because the Court's most recent encounter with the
issue in R.A.V v. City of St. Paul'2 3 is still the subject of widespread
discussion and criticism. 124
A. The Hate Speech Debate
The format of the hate speech debate parallels the scholarly debate
discussed in Part I. Critics of hate speech regulation point out that pro-
posed restrictions amount to government censorship of an abhorrent view-
point, and thus invade our thought processes. 25 In contrast, those who
favor regulation of hate speech argue that such speech is irrational and
coercive, causing severe emotional and psychological damage. 126 Thus,
REV. 1887 (1992); Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography after R.A.V.,
60 U. CH. L. REV. 873 (1993); Charles R. Lawrence, III, Crossburning and the Sound of
Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787 (1992);
Massey, supra note 20; and Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REv.
795 (1993).
122 See, e.g., John Wiener, Words That Wound: Free Speech For Campus Bigots?, 250
NATION 272 (1990); Lee Dembart, At Stanford, Leftists Become Censors, N.Y. TIms, May
5, 1989, at A35; Henry Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993,
at 37; Anthony Lewis, Words Matter, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at A31; Mari Matsuda,
On the Internet, Silence Some to Save Others, NEWSDAY, June 1, 1995, at A34; Jonathan
Rauch, In Defense of Prejudice, HARPER'S, May 1995, at 37; George Will, Liberal
Censorship, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1989, at C7.
123505 U.S. 377 (1992).
124See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24
CAP. U. L. REV. 281 (1995) (criticizing generally R.A.V majority's reasoning); Susan M.
Gilles, Images of the First Amendment and the Reality of Powerful Speakers, 24 CAP. U.
L. REv. 293, 295-96 (1995) (criticizing R.A.V majority for "ignoring the relative power
of speakers"); Thomas C. Grey, How to Write a Speech Code Without Really Trying:
Reflections on the Stanford Experience, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 891, 931-40 (1996)
(criticizing generally R.A.V decision); Juan . Perea, Strange Fruit: Harassment and the
First Amendment, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 876 (1996) ("The abstruse majority opinion
in R.A.V . . . ignores the real victims of the episode."); N. Douglas Wells, Whose
Community? Whose Rights?-Response to Professor Fiss, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 319 (1995)
(criticizing R.A.V Court's failure to allow regulation of hate speech and proposing a
solution based on an international approach); see also articles supra note 121.
125See, e.g., Fried, supra note 1, at 245-46 (noting that those who promulgate campus
speech codes "assign to themselves the authority to determine which ideas are false and
which false ideas people may not express as they choose"); Massey, supra note 20, at 195
("By identifying particular ideas as incompatible with public discourse, [those who favor
regulation of hate speech] impose a censorship on public discourse that is fundamentally
incompatible with autonomous self-governance.").
126See, e.g., Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother
Should Butt In, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 77, 122 (1984) (characterizing hate speech as "linguistic
abuse" and "the kind of fascism which aims at political and economic annihilation of
groups"); Lawrence, supra note 5, at 452-53 (arguing that hate speech is coercive in much
the same manner as fighting words). For general descriptions of the harms caused by hate
speech, see Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, anld Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 135-49 (1982), and Man
J. Matsuda, Public Response To Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320, 2336-41 (1989).
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they argue that regulation of such speech is legitimate for the same
reasons that regulation of fighting words is legitimate. 127 Scholars favoring
regulation further maintain that hate speech silences its victims, thereby
detracting from, rather than contributing to, public deliberation. 128 Sup-
pression of speech in this instance is necessary to preserve the integrity
of public discourse and to ensure that "the victims of racist speech are
heard.' 1 29 At the bottom of both arguments in favor of regulation is the
understanding that hate speech is a substantial barrier to racial equality. 130
Given the nature and history of racism in this country, scholars argue that
progress in social equality may have to "comie] at the expense of the right
of free speech, at least as it has been conceptualized in the modem
tradition.'131 Thus, the hate speech debate pits autonomy against another
of our foundational rights-equality. As one scholar has noted, "[w]e
seem to face a 'tragic choice' in which we cannot defend free speech
without sacrificing [civility and equality], and cannot protect [civility and
equality] without doing violence to the ideal of free speech.' 132
Perhaps recognizing that the Court would not allow a complete ex-
cision of hate speech from public discourse 133 and attempting to alleviate
the tragic choice between liberty and equality, a number of people advo-
cate narrower regulations of hate speech. Most commonly, drafters of such
regulations track the language of the Court's fighting words doctrine by
127 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 451-53.
128 See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 452-54; Delgado & Yun, supra note 121, at 877,
883-85. For an excellent review of the arguments regarding silencing, see Post, supra note
1, at 306-08. To some extent the coercion and silencing arguments are linked, at least
insofar as the coercive effect of the speech results in the silencing of the victim. Professor
Post has reviewed the relationship between the silencing and coercion arguments in detail.
See id. at 302-09.
129Lawrence, supra note 5, at 481.
130 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 5, at 458 (noting the link between racist epithets,
vilification, and inequality).13 1Blim, supra note 121, at 429 (footnote omitted).
132 Heyman, supra note 120, at xiv (footnote omitted); see also Blim, supra note 121,
at 429 (noting that supporters and detractors of hate speech regulation appear to view free
speech and equality "as potentially competing interests").
133The modem Court would surely strike down broad bans on speech that degrades
on the basis of race as being overly broad or as violating its principle against content
discrimination of speech. Indeed, even the four concurring justices in R.A.V, while
criticizing the majority's reasoning in striking down a hate speech ordinance, would have
ruled it unconstitutional as overly broad. See infra note 138.
In fact, many scholars arguing for regulation of hate speech appear to acknowledge
that complete censorship of all racially hateful speech is neither possible nor desirable.
See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 126, at 2357 ("[We should] argue long and hard before
selecting a class of speech to exclude from the public domain .. . .In order to respect
first amendment values, a narrow definition of actionable racist speech is required.");
Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 121, at 825 ("I do not argue for broad bans
on hate speech. Most such bans would indeed violate the First Amendment because they
would forbid a good deal of speech that is intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation:').
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creating a regulation that explicitly bans racially hateful fighting words. 34
By grounding the ban on hate speech in a category of otherwise unpro-
tected speech, proponents of such regulation hope to avoid allegations of
broad censorship of ideas while still punishing the most assaultive and
harmful forms of hate speech. Such proponents believed that the regula-
tion promoted an agenda of social equality without infringing upon our
First Amendment freedoms. 35 It was just such a law that came before the
Court in R.A.V and which, on first glance, appears to have split the
Justices down much the same lines as the scholarly debate.
B. Reviewing R.A.V.
The city ordinance in R.A.V prohibited the display of any "symbol
... including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gen-
der."'136 However, in order to avoid the problem of overbreadth in the
regulation of offensive speech, 37 the majority accepted the Minnesota
134Many such attempts at narrow hate speech regulations have appeared on college
campuses. For example, the Stanford University code provides:
Speech or other expression constitutes [prohibited] harassment by personal vilifica-
tion if it:
(a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of
individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and
(b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or
stigmatizes; and
(c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words or nonverbal symbols . . .
"which by their very utterance inflict injury. . "' [and] are commonly understood
to convey direct and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings on the basis
of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and
ethnic origin.
See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304-05 (3d ed. 1996) (setting
forth Stanford regulation); see also Lawrence, supra note 5, at 450-57 (describing how
Stanford regulation is consistent with the fighting words doctrine).
Proponents of hate speech legislation have also based their arguments for regulation
on other forms of low-value speech. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 126 (arguing for
creation of a tort for racial insults much like the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Lasson, supra note 126 (arguing in favor of laws that prohibit racial defamation).
135 See Grey, supra note 124, at 902-06 (discussing purpose of Stanford speech code);
Lawrence, supra note 5, at 449-57 (discussing need for and constitutionality of regulating
discriminatory fighting words).
136 ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). R.A.V., the minor defendant, was
charged under the ordinance after burning a wooden cross in the yard of a black family
living on the block where he was staying. R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379
(1992).
137For a discussion of the Court's refusal to allow punishment of speech merely
because it is offensive, see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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court's construction of the statute to reach "only those expressions that
constitute 'fighting words' within the meaning of Chaplinsky.' 138 Thus,
the issue that ultimately divided the Court is whether St. Paul could
regulate only racially hateful 139 fighting words while leaving other kinds
of fighting words unpunished.
The majQrity holds the statute to be unconstitutional, primarily be-
cause it regulates fighting words based upon the racially hateful viewpoint
they express.140 Although reaffirming that fighting words are low-value
speech,' 41 the Court rejects the notion that St. Paul could selectively
regulate them. 142 Instead, the Court notes that while "areas of [low-value]
speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because
of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-
. . - they are [not] categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitu-
tion, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content." 43 In the majority's
view, St. Paul had attempted to regulate fighting words not because of
their "'nonspeech' element of communication"' 44 but because they con-
veyed the idea of racial hatred to particular audiences. Thus, the majority
concludes that the ordinance is impermissibly content- and viewpoint-
based.
145
138R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381 (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-11
(Minn. 1991)). Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens would have eschewed
the narrow construction and ruled the ordinance unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds.
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 411 (White, J., concurring).
1391n addition to racially hateful fighting words, the St. Paul ordinance encompassed
fighting words based upon gender, religion, creed, and color. See ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS.
CODE § 292.02 (1990). I use "racially hateful" mainly for ease of reference and because
racial hatred was the context in which the case arose.
140The majority's actual words are that the ordinance is unconstitutional "in that it
prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses." R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 381 (emphasis added). Like Professor Kagan, however, I
believe that the majority's concern lies mainly with viewpoint discrimination, in other
words, that the ordinance is an attempt to punish only certain, abhorrent views regarding
race. See Kagan, supra note 121, at 889 n.47; see also R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 390-94
(discussing ordinance's viewpoint bias).
141Until R.A.V, some commentators doubted whether the Court's fighting words
doctrine remained good law, especially because the Court had not upheld a fighting words
conviction*since Chaplinsky,.315 U.S. 568 (1942).,See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484, 510. After R.A.V., however,
the Court's fighting words doctrine appears to be alive and well, at least in the narrowed
form discussed in its post-Chaplinsky cases. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying
text.
142See R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 384.
143d. at 383-84.
144d. at 386. The Court likens fighting words to a noisy sound truck, noting that
"[e]ach is . . .. a 'mode of speech'; both can be used to convey an idea; but neither has,
in and of itself, a claim upon the First Amendment." Id. (citations omitted).
14See id. at 392. The Court was especially moved by the city's stated desire to send
a message that "group hatred ... is not condoned by the majority." Brief for Respondent
at 25, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (No. 90-7675). "The point of
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This reasoning causes great dismay among the four concurring jus-
tices who accuse the majority of "cast[ing] aside long-established First
Amendment doctrine . .. and adopt[ing] an untried theory."'146 Arguing
that the Court's jurisprudence had long allowed for regulation of low-
value speech based upon its content, they find it "inconsistent to hold that
the government may proscribe an entire category of speech because the
content of that speech is evil ... but that the government may not treat
a subset of.that category differently without violating the First Amend-
ment"'1 47 The majority's approach, they claim, elevates the Court's prohi-
bition on content regulation to unreasonable heights 148 and ignores "the
City's judgment that harms based on race, ,color, creed, religion, and
gender are more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other
fighting words."'149 Indeed, the concurring Justices are so dissatisfied with
the majority's approach that they condemn it as "legitimat[ing] hate speech
as a form of public discussion."5 0
C. A Kantian Perspective
After R.A.V., one might conclude that the scholars engaging in the
autonomy debate have been right all along. Specifically, the Court really
does conceive of autonomy as the right of atomistic individuals to say
whatever they wish even if it harms others. The concurring Justices ap-
parently see that concept in what they label the "new absolutism in the
the First Amendment" the majority notes, "is that majority preferences must be expressed
in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content:' R.A.V, 505 U.S.
at 392.
146 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 398 (White, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun and O'Connorjoined Justice White's opinion. Justice Stevens joined all but Part I.A. thereof. See id. at
397; see also id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring) (eschewing the "absolutism" of Justice
White's assertion that the majority ignores longstanding jurisprudence regarding low-value
speech).
147Id. at 401 (citations omitted).
148 See id. at 400 (White, J., concurring) ("Today ... the Court announces that earlier
Courts did not mean their repeated statements that certain categories of expression are 'not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech."') (quoting Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 483 (1957)); id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[B]y deciding that a State
cannot regulate speech that causes great harm unless it also regulates speech that does not
(setting law and logic on their heads), the Court seems to abandon the categorical approach
.'); id. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Disregarding the vast body of case law, the
Court today ...applies the prohibition on content-based regulation to speech that the
Court had until today considered wholly 'unprotected' by the First Amendment-namely,
fighting words:').
149 d. at 407 (White, J., concurring). Justice White elaborates, noting that "[a]
prohibition on fighting words.., is a ban on a class of speech that conveys an overriding
message of personal injury and imminent violence, a message that is at its ugliest when
directed against groups that have long been targets of discrimination:' Id. at 408-09
(White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
150R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 402.
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prohibition of content-based regulations. 15 1 But such an argument does a
disservice to the majority opinion, for upon closer examination one can
see that the majority's reasoning is consistent with a richer, Kantian
notion of autonomy. Some of the R.A.V Court's rhetoric clearly provides
fuel for the concurring Justices' claim. Indeed, the majority's legal analy-
sis opens with an almost strident statement regarding the evils of content
discrimination, 152 thus seemingly enshrining that concept (and underlying
notions of individualism) as the only significant aspect of the Court's
jurisprudence. But the majority never holds that its principle against
content discrimination prohibits all regulation of racially hateful fighting
words. Indeed, the Court makes quite clear that such speech could be
punished under a neutral fighting words statute. 53 In that sense, its rea-
soning is consistent with a Kantian notion of autonomy, which calls for
regulation of speech that attempts to override our thought processes.
The Court's concern regarding viewpoint discrimination within the
category of fighting words, far from being about atomistic speakers, is
similarly consistent with Kantian autonomy. That notion of autonomy
requires the government to maintain a fine line between regulating speech
that invades our thought processes and regulating speech that appeals to
those thought processes. By regulating only racially hateful fighting words,
the St. Paul ordinance fell on the wrong side of that line. The ordinance's
selective focus made it appear to regulate speech because of the idea of
racial hatred expressed rather than because of the coercive effect associ-
ated with fighting words.1 54 Such an attempt to excise an abhorrent view-
point from public discourse violates the public exercise of reason that is
at the core of Kantian autonomy. 5 5 Thus, the majority's focus on view-
1511d. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring).
152 See id. at 382 ("The First Amendment generally prevents government from pro-
scribing speech .. . or even expressive conduct . . . because of disapproval of the ideas
expressed. Content-based regulations of speech are presumptively invalid.") (citation
omitted). The Court's offhand statement that fighting words "sometimes . . . are quite
expressive indeed," id. at 385, is similarly misleading. Under a Kantian theory, fighting
words can be regulated because of their invasive effect on our thought processes. By
referring to their potentially expressive nature, however, the Court lends credence to the
argument that our First Amendment freedom is mainly a speaker's right.
153 See id. at 394-96.
154 See id. at 396 ("[Tlhe only interest distinctively served by the content limitation is
that of displaying the city council's hostility towards the particular biases thus singled
out."); see also Kagan, supra note 121, at 899-900 ("When the government regulates
within [a] category [of speech] on the basis of a viewpoint extraneous to the category ...
there is reason to suspect that the government is acting not for the reasons already found
by the Court to be legitimate, but rather out of hostility to a message.").
155 One could argue, of course, that the idea of racial hatred is itself coercive and thus
can be excised from public discourse in a manner consistent with Kantian autonomy. Such
an argument, however, conflicts with Kantian autonomy in that it presupposes the rightness
or wrongness of an idea prior to the exercise of our reason. See Heyman, supra note 117,
at 888-92; see also Post, supra note 1, at 310 ("[I]t is fundamentally incompatible with
public discourse to excise specific ideas because they are ... deemed to be coercive.").
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point discrimination does not elevate that principle above all others but
merely attempts to walk a tightrope of preventing private coercive speech
while nevertheless avoiding government censorship, just as the Court has
done throughout its low-value speech analysis.15 6
Perhaps the most significant fact to recognize about R.A.V is its
consistency with the Kantian notion of people as social creatures whose
capacity for autonomy includes responsibility to others. As a legal matter,
we can and should regulate vicious and hateful speech when it amounts
to an invasion of our thought processes. Such circumstances might include
imposing punishment on hate speech when it falls within the rubric of
fighting words, incitement to riot, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, 57 and intimidation. 158 Far from being an illegitimate censorship of
speech as some scholars claim,1 9 punishment of hate speech under such
neutral laws is necessary to preserve the equal dignity of all individuals
and to promote public discourse. 60
Laws that specifically target only racially hateful speech, however,
are a different matter. As a normative issue, we must continue to discuss
the morality of racism. To allow the State to ban communication of the
idea of racial hatred admits that we are incapable of making rational
decisions about that issue, an admission antithetical to Kantian auton-
1561n this sense, the Court's concern over the St. Paul ordinance is similar to its
concern regarding regulation of offensive speech. Although the latter involves overly broad
regulations and the former an underinclusive law, both appear to step over the boundary
of regulating coercive speech and into the realm of regulating ideas.
157The status of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a category of low-value
speech is somewhat unclear. After Hustler Magazine v. Falvell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988),
"public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by reason of publications . . . without showing in addition that the
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice."'
However, commentators seem to agree that the tort is available to private citizens when
speech intentionally causes emotional distress. See Fallon, Harassment, supra note 60, at
10-11 & n.54; Post, supra note 90, at 662.
158The Court has never explicitly recognized intimidation as a category of low-value
speech. Its doctrine has, however, repeatedly assumed that some forms of intimidation,
such as threats, are completely beyond the reach of the First Amendment. See Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); see also Fallon, Harassment, supra note 60, at 13
("[T]he Supreme Court-along with nearly everyone else-has generally treated it as
self-evident that some verbal acts [including threats] get no protection."). Threats, like the
categories of low-value speech, attempt to coerce or circumvent our rational nature. As
such their regulation is consistent with Kantian autonomy. For a different view regarding
when threats should be considered beyond the rubric of the First Amendment, see KENT
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 249-59 (1989).
"59 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 141, at 508-17 (arguing that the Court's fighting
words category and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress generally allow
for government censorship of speech).
160 1t is possible that some speech which does not fall within these categories will
nevertheless be punished. While that is a problem of enforcement over which we must be
watchful, it is not a reason to refuse to regulate hate speech that does fall within regulable
boundaries.
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omy.161 In so doing, we absolve ourselves of the responsibility to discuss
and try to resolve the very significant problem of racial hatred. After all,
if we are incapable of making rational decisions, we cannot possibly be
held accountable for failing to rid ourselves of racism. But responsibility
for racial hatred does not lie with the State; it lies with us. And while the
State can regulate invasive manifestations of that hatred (even those mani-
fested through speech), only we can eradicate the idea of racial hatred by
the Kantian exercise of our public reason through communication.
Conclusion
The Court's use of an autonomy rationale has taken something of a
beating lately. Given the impoverished concept of autonomy that most
scholars attribute to the Court's jurisprudence, such an occurrence is not
surprising. The image of isolated individuals pursuing selfish goals with
little or no thought for personal responsibility is disturbing considering
that we live in a society rather than a state of nature. Unfortunately, that
image tends to be the one most often associated with autonomy, not just
among free speech scholars but among the general public as well. 162 And
because "[a]utonomy is an ideal with distinctive importance in modem
life' 163 many have come to defend even this meager conception vehe-
mently.
161 This is not to say that all viewpoint discrimination is necessarily inconsistent with
Kantian autonomy. While a thorough discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, one
could fashion an argument that, in certain contexts, regulation of particular viewpoints
does not amount to the excision of a particular idea but rather amounts to regulation of
invasive conduct. Thus, one might be able to argue that workplace harassment laws are
not concerned about ideas but with the particularly coercive effect of such speech in the
workplace environment. Such an argument is similar to the Court's previously announced
doctrine that protects a "captive audience" from offensive speech because of the context
in which the speech occurs. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
304 (1974) (plurality opinion) (ruling that a city's decision not to subject users of the local
rapid transit system to the "blare of political propaganda" is constitutional). In contrast,
the ordinance at issue in R.A.V criminalized racially hateful fighting words that were part
of public discourse, a situation where captive audience concerns do not come into play.
Thus, the regulation aimed at suppressing particularly abhorrent ideas in a manner
inconsistent with Kantian autonomy. For other arguments regarding the importance of
context in free speech jurisprudence, see KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDs 81, 86-87
(1995) (discussing the importance of context in free speech analysis of workplace
harassment); Mary Becker, How Free is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 815,
872-73 (1996) (noting the distinction between regulation of public discourse and work-
place harassment); and Fallon, Harassment, supra note 60, at 38-41 (discussing generally
the importance of context in free speech jurisprudence).
162As an extreme example, the Montana Freemen's recent self-proclaimed secession
from organized society was mainly orchestrated in the name of "freedom'" See John
Balzar, A Little Too Much Freedom?, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1996, at Al (discussing the
"growing hunger for absolute freedom, which could also be called grand self-indulgence,
[that] produced the . . . 'freemen').
163Fallon, Autonomy, supra note 29, at 902-03. Professor Fallon explains that "[i]n
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But notions of autonomy need not be so empty. Rather, a complete
measure of autonomy recognizes that it is not merely a right but a moral
entitlement to freedom. In turn, this implies a responsibility to respect the
autonomy of others. Despite scholars' claims, the Court's free speech
jurisprudence has implicitly incorporated such a notion of autonomy.
Understanding this fact may allow us to reassess our understanding of the
meaning of the term "freedom of speech." A refurbished notion of auton-
omy reveals that "freedom of speech" does not mean using speech in any
manner we see fit. Rather, we are morally and legally obligated to use
speech in a manner that respects the thought processes of others. It also
means, however, that we cannot cede to the State our ability and obliga-
tion to discuss and attempt to resolve the pressing issues of our time.
the cacophony of pluralist culture, the 'idea has entered very deep' that every person
possesses her own originality, and that it is of 'crucial moral importance' for each to lead
a life that is distinctively self-made." Id. (quoting CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF
AUTHENTICITY 28-29 (1992)).
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